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FILE No. **R 1/2** (Part **C**)

TITLE: **KURDS IN IRAQ** **W 418**

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
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<b>R</b>		<b>6/1</b>						
<b>PKW</b>	<b>140</b>							

**ECO 8/2309**



Registry Address

**W 92**

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GRS 1130

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270600Z NOV.

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DESKBY 271500Z NOV.

RECEIVED IN
27 NOV 1974
NBR 1/2

TOP COPY  
NBR 28/4  
pe

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 446 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1974, INFO  
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND MOSCOW.

110  
YOUR TEL 300 (NOT TO MOSCOW) : KURDISTAN.

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY  
SITUATION IN THE NORTH AND ITS LIKELY EFFECT UPON THE  
STABILITY OF THE REGIME AND UPON IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAN.

## 2(A) MILITARY SITUATION.

TERRITORY AT PRESENT HELD BY GOVT FORCES LIES WEST OF AN  
APPROXIMATE LINE FROM ZAKHO TO DOHUK, AQRA, KHAZNAH, ERBIL,  
SPILLIK, RANIYA, RAWANDUZ INCLUDING ZUZAK HEIGHTS AND PART OF  
HANDRAN MTH, ERBIL, KOISANJAO, RANIA, QALAT DIZAH, DOKHAN,  
SULAIMANIYA, KHANEQIN TO IRANIAN BORDER (FULLER DETAILS IN  
DA'S TELEGRAM FOH 261200Z NOV TO MOD), AND INCLUDES THOSE  
TOWNS AND MAIN ROADS. MOST OF ARMY EXCLUDING 10 DIV AND 2 BDES  
FROM 5 DIV ARE CONCENTRATED IN NORTH TOGETHER WITH APPROX TEN  
RESERVE BDES AND A LARGE NUMBER OF POLICE BNS. TOTAL STRENGTH  
IS ESTIMATED IN EXCESS OF 200,000 MEN. ECONOMIC BLOCKADE HAS BEEN  
LIFTED IN GOVT HELD AREAS, VILLAGES ARE OCCUPIED, FARMING IN  
PROGRESS AND ALL ROUTES OPEN BY DAY. MORALE OF OFFICERS AND  
MEN APPEARS TO BE HIGH AND THEY SPEAK PROUDLY OF THEIR UNDOUBTED  
ACHIEVEMENTS THIS YEAR. THEY BLAME IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT FOR  
NOT ACHIEVING FURTHER SUCCESSES AND SPEAK BITTERLY OF IRANIAN  
SHELLING OF RAWANDUZ, RANIA AND QALAT DIZAH AREAS.

## 2(B) OUTLOOK.

THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT THE ARMY HAS, UNLIKE PREVIOUS  
YEARS, EVERY INTENTION OF STAYING IN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS.  
ALTHOUGH NO FURTHER OFFENSIVES ARE ENVISAGED BEFORE THE SPRING



(APART FROM A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE BARZAN AND THE REST OF HANDRAN MOUNTAIN), THEY ARE DETERMINED TO FIGHT OFF ANY KURDISH ATTEMPTS TO PUSH THEM BACK. THERE IS WIDESPREAD EVIDENCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF WELL DEFENDED BASES WITH THREE MONTH STOCKPILE OF FOOD, AMMO, POL AND WOOD AND THE HEAVY USE OF HELICOPTERS FOR RESUPPLY. THEY ACCEPT THE DANGERS OF KURDISH INFILTRATION TO CUT THEIR L OF C AND ATTACK REAR AREAS BUT SEEM CONFIDENT OF NOT ENDING THE WINTER WITH A SERIES OF ISOLATED GARRISONS. WITH THE MANPOWER AND VAST AMOUNT OF NEW EQUIPMENT THEY POSSES THEY HOPE TO RENEW OFFENSIVES IN THE SPRING FROM STRONG FORWARD POSITIONS WITH HOPES OF EARLY SUCCESSES TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH ARMY OFFICERS SEE IS NECESSARY.

### 3. STABILITY OF THE REGIME.

THE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM BY MILITARY MEANS WITH WHICH SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS BEEN LARGELY IDENTIFIED, HAS BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. THE IRAQI ARMY APPEAR, HOWEVER, TO HAVE ACHIEVED GREATER SUCCESS THAN EVER BEFORE AND WITHOUT STRONG IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS THEY MIGHT WELL HAVE OVERWHELMED THE REBELLION. THIS MEASURE OF SUCCESS HAS BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN SADDAM HUSSEIN'S POSITION. INDEED THE BA'ATH PARTY (ABSP) HAS STRENGTHENED ITS HOLD ON THE GOVERNMENT IN THE RECENT MINISTERIAL RE-SHUFFLE IN WHICH IT SEEMS THAT THE ARMY'S REPRESENTATIVES SUFFERED DEMOTION (MY LETTER TO WRIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER). IN MAKING THESE CHANGES HUSSEIN WILL HAVE HAD IN MIND THE MOOD OF THE ARMY, THE CHIEF THREAT TO ANY IRAQI REGIME, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH, SO THAT THE CHANGES MUST BE SEEN AS A SIGN OF CONFIDENCE IN ITS LOYALTY. FACTORS IN THE ARMY'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE (A) DOUBTS ABOUT THE AIMS OF THE KURDISH CAMPAIGN SEMI COLON (B) THE COST IN CASUALTIES AND (C) THE DEGREE OF CIVILIAN (I.E. ABSP) INTERFERENCE IN DAY TO DAY RUNNING OF THE ARMY. BUT I BELIEVE THESE <sup>are present</sup> ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT NEUTRALISED BY THE SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT BAKR ENJOYS FROM SENIOR RANKING OFFICERS AND OTHERS AND ABOVE ALL BY THE EFFICIENCY AND RUTHLESSNESS OF HUSSEIN'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. THESE FACTORS ARE LIKELY, IN MY VIEW, TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS ENSURING THAT THE ARMY DOES NOT (NOT) BECOME A SERIOUS THREAT, SO LONG AS BAKR REMAINS PRESIDENT. ON HIS DEATH (HE HAS NOT BEEN SEEN IN PUBLIC SINCE HIS WIFE'S DEATH) OR REMOVAL THE MALCONTENTS IN THE ARMY COULD DECIDE TO TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT HUSSEIN'S SUCCESSION.



4. COUP ORGANISED FOR EXAMPLE BY A SMALL BAND OF MALCONTENTS WITHIN THE ABSP, SUCH AS THAT OF JUNE 1973, IS POSSIBLE AT ANY TIME, FOR REASONS NOT NECESSARILY RELATED TO THE KURDISH ISSUE. BY DEFINITION WE ARE HIGHLY UNLIKELY TO GET WIND OF ANY SUCH PLOT IN ADVANCE.

5. IRAQ/SOVIET RELATIONS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF IRAQ'S KURDISH POLICY, URGING SOLUTION BY NEGOTIATION. THIS HAS NOT (NOT) PRECLUDED HER FROM SUPPLYING (A) ARMS FOR USE IN THE CAMPAIGN, (B) 'ADVISORS' AND TECHNICIANS, AND (C) PROBABLY ALSO A SMALL NUMBER OF PILOTS. SOVIET PRESSURE FOR SETTLEMENT BY PEACEFUL MEANS WILL NOT (NOT) LESSEN, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PRESSURE WOULD BE REINFORCED BY USE OF ANY OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF SANCTION AVAILABLE, E.G. A CUT IN ARMS SUPPLIES OR WITHDRAWAL OF ADVISORS. SOVIET/IRAQI RELATIONS ARE CLOSE AND IT IS PROBABLY SEEN BY BOTH SIDES AS IMPORTANT THAT THIS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. AS SEEN FROM HERE, KURDISH PROBLEM IS NOT (NOT) AS YET AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE RUSSIANS, EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. IT IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY THAT THE CONTINUING CONFLICT IN KURDISTAN WILL HAVE MUCH IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON IRAQ/SOVIET RELATIONS.

6. IRAQ/IRAN.

DIFFICULTY HERE IS TO KNOW HOW FAR THE SHAH WILL GO IN HIS SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. IRANIANS ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR BARZANI'S ABILITY TO RESIST, AND I WOULD NOT (NOT) RULE OUT IRAQI USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAN IF THE DEGREE OF IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR BARZANI CONTINUES AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL OR INCREASES IN THE SPRING OF 1975, WHEN PRESUMABLY OFFENSIVES WILL RECOMMENCE.

7. NOTWITHSTANDING PARA 6, I BELIEVE IRAQ WOULD GENUINELY PREFER TO SEE THE SETTLEMENT OF HER VARIOUS DISPUTES WITH IRAN. HER OWN INTERESTS, AND THE NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, DICTATE THIS, BUT THERE IS ALSO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE OTHER ARAB STATES, WHO NEED IRAN'S CO-OPERATION OVER PALESTINE AND



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OIL. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BROKEN  
OFF OVER THE (RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT) ISSUE OF THE ISLANDS IN  
1971, HAVE NOT (NOT) BEEN BROKEN AGAIN, DESPITE OVERWHELMING  
EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTH.

GRAHAM

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R 124

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FO 664/E 008/28

LKS 415/28

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GRS 25

DESKBY 280900Z

N CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 280750Z NOV

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NO DISTRIBUTION

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 35 28 NOV 1974 NBR 1/2
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IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 280900Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 453 OF 28 NOVEMBER AND SAVING TO  
TEHRAN AND MOSCOW.

123

MY TEL 446 : KURDISTAN

PLEASE AMEND PARA 3, 7TH SENTENCE, TO READ :

"BUT I BELIEVE THESE, WHERE PRESENT, ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT  
... .."

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN AND MOSCOW.

GRAHAM

( Repeated as requested )

*[Handwritten signature]*

NNNN



GRS 600

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 280830Z

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 28 NOV 1974  NBR 1/2
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DESKBY 280930Z (FCO)

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 651 OF 28 NOVEMBER, 1974  
INFO BAGHDAD, MOSCOW.

YOUR TEL NO 300 TO BAGHDAD

KURDISTAN

1. OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE KURDS ARE HOLDING ZUZAK AND THAT THEIR MORALE IS HIGH NOW THAT THE WEATHER HAS AT LAST BROKEN.
2. AS THE TEMPQ OF THE FIGHTING DIES DOWN, THE MAIN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FOR THE IRANIANS IS THE REFUGEES. ACCORDING TO THE HEAD OF THE RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM, THEY NOW NUMBER 120,000. THE IRANIANS PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THEIR ABILITY TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM ON THEIR OWN AND HAVE SOUGHT NO INTERNATIONAL AID (THOUGH I UNDERSTAND THAT UNHCR AND ICRC REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN HERE LOOKING AT THE SITUATION).
3. HAVING HELPED THE KURDS ATTAIN THEIR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF SURVIVAL UNTIL THE WINTER, THE SHAH WILL NOW HAVE A BREATHING SPACE TO CONSIDER THIS POLICY. HIS BASIC DILEMMA REMAINS IE THAT HE FEELS THAT HE CAN NEITHER AFFORD TO LET THE KURDS LOSE OUTRIGHT NOR (MORE IMPROBABLY) WIN TOO DECISIVELY. (HE REMAINS VERY SENSITIVE TO ANY MENTION OF THE LATTER POINT - SEE MY TELEGRAM NO 581). HE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF JUST HOW FAR HE HAS BECOME EMBROILED IN RECENT MONTHS (MY LETTER 3/2 OF 24 OCTOBER TO WRIGHT MED) AND OF THE COMPLICATIONS WHICH THIS INVOLVES (EG RAPIER TECHNICIANS). HE IS ALSO WELL AWARE OF THE RISKS OF IRAQI COUNTERACTION. IN PARTICULAR HIS EVIDENT

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/INABILITY



INABILITY TO PROTECT HIS BORDER VILLAGES EFFECTIVELY FROM IRAQI AIR STRIKES WITH CONSEQUENT EFFECT ON THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS DEFENCE FORCES MUST CAUSE HIM WORRY.

4. I THINK THAT HE WOULD NOW WELCOME AN INITIATIVE TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT, BUT ONLY ON A BASIS WHICH THE KURDS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT. HE WILL REACT TO THE RABAT MEDIATION DECISION PRIMARILY ACCORDING TO ITS SUCCESS IN INFLUENCING THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THIS DIRECTION; BUT HE WILL REGARD THE SOVIET POSITION AS THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN MODERATING IRAQI POLICIES. I WILL ATTEMPT WHEN I NEXT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FIND OUT HOW HE SEES SOVIET POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT.

5. IF THERE ARE NO MOVES TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT DURING THE WINTER, AND FIGHTING STARTS UP AGAIN, THE OLD DILEMMA WILL RAPIDLY REEMERGE AND, ONCE AGAIN, I WOULD EXPECT THE SHAH TO PROVIDE WHATEVER LEVEL OF IRANIAN SUPPORT IS NEEDED TO KEEP THE KURDS IN BUSINESS, SHORT OF COMMITTING IRANIAN FORMATIONS TO DIRECT AND OVERT ENCOUNTERS WITH THE IRAQI ARMY.

PARSONS

FILES

MED  
EESD  
MR WEIR



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GRS 155

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 010620Z DEC.

C-O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 455 OF 1 DECEMBER 1974. INFO  
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND MOSCOW.

TEHRAN TEL NO 651 : KURDISTAN.

MSB 2/12  
pa

PARA 4.

IN CONVERSATION THE OTHER NIGHT WITH THE SOVIET COUNSELLOR, WHOM I KNEW SOME YEARS AGO IN KUWAIT, I SAID THAT WHILE THERE WAS MUCH TALK OF THE NEED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE ONE EMERGING, NOW THAT FIGHTING HAD STARTED, UNTIL ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER HAD HAD ENOUGH. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS POINT HAD BEEN REACHED.

2. KHANOV AGREED BUT ADDED THAT THERE MIGHT BE ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE, THAT A THIRD PARTY MIGHT BRING ITS WEIGHT TO BEAR. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR AT TASHKENT WAS AN EXAMPLE.

3. KHANOV COULD MERELY HAVE BEEN MAKING A GENERAL POINT BUT IT CAME SO QUICKLY THAT I WONDER WHETHER THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT HAVE SOMETHING LIKE THIS IN MIND. GIVEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH BOTH PARTIES THEY ARE PROBABLY AS WELL PLACED AS ANYBODY.

GRAHAM

F I L E S

MED

EESD

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

SIR J KILLICK


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(127)

Mr Weir



M. R. *[initials]* 2/12  
pa  
*[signature]* 1/12

KURDISTAN

Flag A

On your copy of Baghdad tel no 446 you minuted asking to see FCO tel no 300 and Mr Graham's letter of 20 November.

Flags B and C

These are now attached. You may also care to see Mr Parsons' comments on the situation contained in

Flag D

Tehran tel no 651 125

*[signature]*  
G S Burton  
Middle East Department

29 November 1974

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
- 3 DEC 1974  
NBR 1/2

PRIORITY

FO 244/~~E105702~~

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PP MODUK

GRS 65

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 021025Z DEC.

S E C R E T

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL OF 2 DECEMBER 1974.

DIG FOH.  
FROM DA.

MOD DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Brown 3/12  
JF 3/1-

FURTHER TO MY WEEKLY REPORT FOH 260745Z NOV AND MY REPORT  
ON NORTHERN TOUR SENT BY BAG.

COMD 4 DIV INTIMATED THAT AN OPERATION HAD BEEN MOUNTED  
IN THE DOHUK AREA PRIOR TO THE AQRA OPERATION WHICH WE ASSUMED  
WAS STILL GOING ON. HE WOULD NOT ELABORATE BUT THE INITIAL  
AIM SEEMED TO BE TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM AQRA.

GRAHAM  
BT

12402  
C



DESKBY 031200Z

MED  
**MOD DISTRIBUTION**

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 031030Z NOV INFO PRIORITY JISNE  
AND SAVING KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

DIG FOH

WEEKLY SUMMARY

REGISTRY No 35
- 4 DEC 1974
NBR 1/2

Mr. Williams  
4/12  
ma  
12

ONE. KURDISTAN. FIGHTING STILL IN PROGRESS IN DOHUK, RAWANDUZ AREA, NORTH OF RANIA AND EAST OF QALAT DIZAH. GOVT FORCES NOT MOUNTING OFFENSIVES BUT CONSOLIDATING WHERE THEY ARE AND TRYING TO STAY THERE. REPORT CONFIRMED BY TURKISH MA WHO SAYS 30 GOVT SOLDIERS AND ONE COLONEL WERE KILLED IN A GUERILLA ACTION ON THE ROAD BETWEEN KIRKUK AND CHAMCHAMAL A WEEK AGO. REPORTS ALSO OF KURDISH ATTACKS ON SULAIMANIYA.

2. PRESIDENT BAKR HAS STILL NOT APPEARED IN PUBLIC SINCE DEATH OF HIS WIFE AND DID NOT RECEIVE FRENCH P.M. WHO LEFT AFTER 3 DAY VISIT TO IRAQ YESTERDAY. BRITISH DOCTOR AND EMBASSY DOCTOR (IRAQI) REPORT BAKR IS SUFFERING FROM HEART COMPLAINT DIABETES AND MAYBE GOING BLIND. ON THE OTHER HAND EGYPTIANS SAY HE IS NOT AS ILL AS PEOPLE IMAGINE. TAKE YOUR PICK.

3. GEN VICTOR KOLIKOV AND FIVE (?) SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICERS COMPLETED VISIT TO IRAQ 1 DECEMBER. FAREWELL SPEECH SPOKE OF " OPPORTUNITY TO GET TO KNOW SOCIAL LIFE....." AND OBTAIN FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS SECURED BY PEOPLE UNDER PROGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP..... FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO ACQUAINT OURSELVES WITH MILITARY AND TRAINING LIFE OF IRAQ ARMED FORCES AND SHOWED EVIDENCE OF STRENGTH AND DEVELOPING RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND USSR.

YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TOLD ME LAST NIGHT HE FELT SURE PROBLEMS OVER RUSSIAN SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION HAD BEEN RESOLVED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR BREZNEV'S VISIT IN JANUARY. VISITORS DID USUAL TOUR IN AND AROUND BAGHDAD BUT SPENT TWO DAYS IN BASRA DURING WHICH THEY SAW ARMY EXERCISES. RUSSIAN MA TOLD ME THEY SAW REGULAR ARMD BDE DEMONSTRATION WHICH INCLUDED BN ATTACK.



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MA TOLD ME THEY SAW REGULAR ARMD BDE DEMONSTRATION WHICH  
INCLUDED BN ATTACK.

4. AIR CHIEF MARSHAL O.P. MEHRA INDIAN CHIEF OF AIR STAFF  
LEFT BAGHDAD 2 DEC AFTER WEEK'S VISIT. HE TOLD ME IT WAS  
A ROUTINE VISIT OF NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE AND HAD NOT WANTED  
IT TO BE AS LONG AS 7 DAYS.


5. IRANIAN MA ASKED IF I HAD ANY INFO ON STURGEON ROCKETS  
FIRZ GUNS SUPPLIED BY UNKNOWN COUNTRY TO IRAQ AND F104, 204  
AND 116 FRENCH UHF RADIOS. CANNOT TRACE THESE ITEMS.  
DO WE HAVE ANY INFO?

6. MAD AXEMEN NOW EXECUTED SO NORBURY SHOULD HAVE SAFE VISIT. 2

PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT DAMASCUS BEIRUT ANKARA AND TEHRAN.

GRAHAM  
BT





Mr Weir o.r.

THE KURDISH WAR

- A 1. Mr Weir's minute of 4 December refers.
- B 2. When we previously minuted on this information we had no  
C by , but we have since seen a reference to a possible visit  
by g to Iran made by the Jordanian Ambassador in Abu Dhabi.
- D 3. You may like to see again the attached assessment prepared  
last week by the JIC, which concluded that although there may be  
some manoeuvring during the winter, given the nature of Kurdish  
and Iraqi demands, we are not hopeful of the prospects for a  
political settlement. There are none the less good reasons for  
B both Iraq and Iran (not to mention the Russians) to want a settle-  
ment and if, as the report indicates, the Iraqis really are  
prepared to negotiate about the border problem in the Shatt Al Arab  
on the basis of the "thalweg" principle there must be at least a  
slight chance of success. The "thalweg" principle and Iraq's  
consistent refusal to recognise it as a basis for negotiations  
has always proved to be a major stumbling block to an improvement  
in relations between Iraq and Iran.

T J Clark  
Middle East Department

10 December 1974

10/12  
15/12



GRS 500

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 101030Z DEC.

SECRET



TOP COPY

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL OF 10 DECEMBER 1974, INFO PRIORITY  
JISNE. AND SAVING KUWAIT, BEIRUT, ANKARA, DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN.

DIG FOH.

*Not copied to [unclear]  
[unclear] 11/12  
[unclear]*

FROM NORBURY FOR MCKAY.

WEEKLY SUMMARY.

ONE. KURDISTAN. A THIN WEEK AND LITTLE MORE TO REPORT  
THAN ALREADY GLEANED FROM OTHER SOURCES.

ALPHA. IT IS CLEAR BY TALKING TO A RECENT VISITOR TO  
SULAIMANIYA THAT LIFE THERE IS FAR FROM NORMAL AND THERE  
ARE FREQUENT KURDISH SABOTAGE AND NUISANCE RAIDS. THIS  
PERHAPS IS AN INDICATION THAT THE KURDS HAVE ALREADY SET  
OUT TO MAINTAIN THEIR ACTIVITY AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE  
WINTER MONTHS.

BRAVO. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD DA THAT HE  
ASSESSES MILITARY MORALE NOW AS GOOD AMONGST MANY OF  
THE IRAQ ARMY OFFICERS IN THE NORTH. THEY ARE PROUD OF  
THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE LAST FEW MONTHS. HE  
AGREES THAT THEY HAVE DONE BETTER THIS YEAR THAN EVER  
BEFORE AND THAT THEY ARE WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE  
OF A HEARTS AND MINDS OPERATION IN THOSE AREAS NOW UNDER  
GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

CHARLIE. AMBASSADOR CALLED ON CGS THIS MORNING AND CGS  
ALSO CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS CAMPAIGN  
AND HE RAISED QUESTION OF THE REPORTS OF BARZANI'S DEATH.  
CGS SAID ALL THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT BARZANI WAS DEAD BUT  
HE WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT CONFIRM IT. TO SUPPORT HIS  
BELIEF HE GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF A PROMISED BROADCAST  
ON RADIO KURDISTAN WHICH DID NOT MATERIALISE AND HAD  
RESULTED IN A REPORTED READING OF A SERIES OF QUESTIONS PUT  
TO BARZANI AND HIS ANSWERS.

SECRET

/TWO.



TWO. PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE DA THAT HE THOUGHT IT MOST LIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN SPRING ON BOTH THE SINAI AND GOLON FRONTS AND HE FELT CERTAIN THAT IRAQ WOULD PARTICIPATE.

THREE. COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE. THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE DA THAT BRIG DULAYNI'S RECENT APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND THE AIR FORCE MAY INDICATE THE START OF A TREND VIS-A-VIS CONTROL OF THE SERVICES BY THE BAATH. HE REPORTED THAT DULAYNI IS NOT REPEAT NOT A MEMBER OF THE BAATH AND WAS SELECTED FOR HIS CAPABILITIES RATHER THAN HIS POLITICAL LEANINGS. HE FELT THE BAATH HAD REALISED THE SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS OF SELECTING CHARACTERLESS, WEAK, YES MEN TO COMMAND APPOINTMENTS.

FOUR. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING KUWAIT, BEIRUT, ANKARA, DAMASCUS AND TEHRAN.

GRAHAM

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FILES

MED  
DEFENCE DEPT  
PUSD  
MR CAMPBELL  
MR WEIR  
SIR G ARTHUR  
MR THOMSON



(132)

1107/12

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PP MODUK ✓

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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120830Z DEC

SECRET

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REGISTRY No 35  
16 DEC 1974  
NBR 1/2

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 120845Z DECEMBER.

DIG FOH

FROM DA FOR D14

Mr. Brown  
Mr. Williams  
12/12  
13/11  
x11  
pa

REPORTED DEATH OF MULLA MUSTAPHA BARZANI.

RUMOURS CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE HERE ON THE MULLA'S DEATH  
AS FOLLOWS :

1. TURKISH MA REPORTS RADIO KURDISTAN BROADCAST OF 26/27 NOVEMBER REPORTING HIS DEATH NEAR SULAIMANIYA DURING AIR ATTACK.
2. FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAYS HE WAS KILLED IN ACTION SOON AFTER HE LEFT HOSPITAL IN TEHRAN. FRENCH MA SAYS HE IS 85 PER CENT (HIGH FOR HIM) SURE BARZANI IS DEAD.
3. CGS SAYS ALL INDICATIONS ARE HE IS DEAD BUT WILL NOT CONFIRM.



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(HIGH FOR HIM) SURE BARZANI IS DEAD.
3. CGS SAYS ALL INDICATIONS ARE HE IS DEAD BUT WILL NOT  
CONFIRM.
4. ON THE OTHER HAND MULLA IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE GIVEN A  
PRESS CONFERENCE ON 26 NOVEMBER.
5. IRANIAN MA DOES NOT DISCOUNT RUMOURS BUT SUSPECTS IT IS  
BAATH INSPIRED RUMOUR.
6. HAVE YOU ANY FIRM NEWS?


GRAHAM

~~BT~~

SENT TO D.C.C.

NNNN



Note for the File

1. Mr Galsworthy telephoned on 11 December from the House of Lords to say that Lord Goronwy-Roberts, who was participating in the Middle East debate, had been warned that he might be asked questions on our attitude to the Kurdish issue. What line should Lord Goronwy-Roberts take?

2. After some discussion we agreed that if asked Lord Goronwy-Roberts should say that HMG were aware of the unfortunate situation in Iraq but that it was not for us to speculate on the rights or wrongs of the matter. The problem was one of a purely internal nature. We did know however that some 100,000 Kurdish refugees had crossed into Iran where they were being well cared for by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society.

12 December 1974

  
G S Burton  
Middle East Department

pe



IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER CAT A  
GRS 460/4

SECRET

133

FM BAGHDAD 171030Z DEC

TOP COPY

SECRET

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 17 DEC 1974 NBR 1/2
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DESKBY 171400Z DEC

MED to enter

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 171030Z DEC AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
AND TEHRAN (DESKBY MODUK ONLY) INFO PRIORITY JISNE AND SAVING  
KUWAIT BEIRUT ANKARA AND DAMASCUS.

DIG FOH

RSB 17/12  
p.

WEEKLY SUMMARY

ONE. KURDISTAN

IRAQ MOD ISSUED FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE YESTERDAY QUOTE AT  
ABOUT 1700 HRS DEC 14 WHILE OUR PLANES WERE CARRYING OUT THEIR  
DUTIES IN THE NORTHERN AREA INSIDE IRAQI TERRITORY ONE OF THEM  
FLYING AT A HIGH ALTITUDE WAS DESTROYED WITH A GROUND TO AIR  
HAWK MISSILE OF AMERICAN MAKE AND WITH WHICH IRANIAN FORCES  
ARE EQUIPPED.

AT 1600 HRS ON DEC 15 THE ACT WAS REPEATED AND ONE MORE OF OUR  
PLANES WAS HIT WITH A HAWK MISSILE IN THE SAME AREA AGAIN  
WITHIN IRAQI TERRITORY. THE IRANIAN ENCROACHMENTS, ACTS OF  
INTERVENTION AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION BACKED UP BY AMERICAN  
IMPERIALISM HAVE NOW ENTERED UPON A DANGEROUS STAGE. IRAN  
AND THOSE WHO STAND BEHIND IT SHALL BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF  
THEIR ACTS.

TWO. ACTION IS HEADLINED IN LOCAL PRESS WITH BARE FACTS  
AND LITTLE COMMENT; WE BELIEVE BOTH AIRCRAFT DESTROYED.

THREE. WINTER NOW WELL ADVANCED WITH THICK SNOW ON HIGH  
GROUND IN NORTH TEMPERATURES KIRKUK . MIN 2 MAX 14 MOSUL  
MIN 4 MAX 12 BAGHDAD MIN 7 MAX 10.

SECRET

/ FOUR



SECRET

FOUR. GOVT FORCES CONTINUE ACTIVE PATROLLING AND SHELLING AS WELL AS HEAVY BOMBING RAIDS ON ALL FRONTS.

FIVE. RUMOURS OF DEATH OF BARZANI CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE.

SIX. THIS TEL BEING COPIED TO WASHINGTON AT REQUEST OF LOWRIE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES:

DEF D

MED

MR. THOMSON

MR. CAMPBELL


MR. WEIR

- 2 -  
SECRET



(134)

Mr Weir ✓ o.r.

ASB 12/12  
f

## THE KURDISH WAR

- A 1. Mr Weir's minute of 4 December refers.
- B 2. When we previously minuted on this information we had no  
C collateral, but we have since seen a reference to a possible visit  
by the King to Iran made by the Jordanian Ambassador in Abu Dhabi.
- D 3. You may like to see again the attached assessment prepared  
last week by the JIC, which concluded that although there may be  
some manoeuvring during the winter, given the nature of Kurdish  
and Iraqi demands, we are not hopeful of the prospects for a  
political settlement. There are none the less good reasons for  
both Iraq and Iran (not to mention the Russians) to want a settle-  
B ment and if, as the report indicates, the Iraqis really are  
prepared to negotiate about the border problem in the Shatt Al Arab  
on the basis of the "thalweg" principle there must be at least a  
slight chance of success. The "thalweg" principle and Iraq's  
consistent refusal to recognise it as a basis for negotiations  
has always proved to be a major stumbling block to an improvement  
in relations between Iraq and Iran.

T J Clark  
Middle East Department

10 December 1974



(135)

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PRIORITY

~~LLC NR 194/18~~

PP MODUK

~~RR BAGHDAD~~

~~GRS 58~~

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 180537Z

REC'D REGISTRATION 19 DEC 1971 NBR 1/2
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*M. R. 19/12*  
*Y. 18/12 pa*

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO FOH 1541 OF 180435Z DEC, INFO BAGHDAD.  
MOD FOR DI4, BAGHDAD FOR DA. YOUR FOH OF 131200Z DEC AND  
131215Z DEC. REPORTED DEATH OF BARZANI. WE ALSO HAVE HEARD  
RUMOURS OF DEATH OF BARZANI INCLUDING RUMOUR THAT HE DIED  
OF WOUNDS IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL IN TEHRAN. WE HAVE BEEN  
INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THEM. AMA WAS TOLD CATEGORICALLY ON  
16 DEC BY COLONEL DANESHVAR OF J2 PROTOCOL OFFICE THAT  
BARZANI WAS NOT RPT NOT DEAD. WE BELIEVE THIS TO BE TRUE.  
PARSONS  
BT

SENT C.

NNNN

*0906 #118*



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GRS 350

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 180730Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 35 19 DEC 1974 N8R1/2
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1974

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 695 OF 18 DEC/ INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD.  
MY TELEGRAM NO 693: IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN I SAW ALAM ON 17 DECEMBER, HE WAS JUBILANT. HE EXPRESSED DELIGHT AT THE PERFORMANCE OF RAPIER AND OF ITS IRANIAN OPERATORS. HE MAINTAINED THAT RAPIER HAD IN FACT DOWNED TWO AIRCRAFT (AS REPORTED IN TODAY'S IRANIAN PRESS).

2. I TOLD ALAM THAT I THOUGHT THAT OUR TECHNICAL PEOPLE WOULD BE VERY KEEN TO HAVE A LOOK AT ANY WRECKAGE WHICH MIGHT BE ACCESSIBLE. ALAM SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT THIS. IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT OUR PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXAMINE THE WRECKAGE. HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE SHAH TODAY.

3. AS REGARDS THE ACTUAL FIGHTING IN KURDISTAN, ALAM SAID THAT THE KURDS WERE NOW IN BETTER SHAPE - THE DOWNING OF THE IRAQI AIRCRAFT WOULD GIVE THEIR MORALE A FURTHER LIFT. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD SURVIVE THE WINTER. HE ADDED THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE MUCH MORE HELP AND ENABLE THE KURDS TO PUSH THE IRAQIS BACK. BUT THEY WOULD NOT DO SO. THE SHAH DID NOT WANT TO INVOLVE IRAN IN WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO OPEN WAR WITH IRAQ. THEIR INTENTION WAS TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE KURDS AFLOAT AND TO HELP THEM TO FORTIFY THEIR POSITIONS DURING THE WINTER SO THAT THEY COULD WITHSTAND A FRESH IRAQI OFFENSIVE NEXT SPRING. WHAT THE KURDS NEEDED WAS MORE LONG RANGE ARTILLERY. AS I KNEW, IRAN HAD ALREADY PROVIDED SOME, AS THE ECONOMIST HAD IRRESPONSIBLY POINTED OUT THIS WEEK, AND IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OUT THE IRANIAN GUN POSITIONS FROM THE AIR HAD BEEN PATHETICALLY INEFFECTIVE.

PARSONS

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19 DEC 1974

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NBR 20/12

Mr Weir  
Mr Coles

## KURDISH REFUGEES: MR DALYELL'S LETTER OF 15 DECEMBER

1. The "War on Want" letter enclosed with Mr Dalyell's raises two major points: of possible HMG intervention with the Iraq Government and of similar action with the Turkish Government either directly or through the EEC. I attach a draft reply which for the first point draws largely on Mr Ennals' letter of 20 September to Russell Johnston MP.
2. The Turkish Government's primary consideration in closing their border with Iran to Kurdish refugees was presumably their interest in improving relations with Iraq. Although we well appreciate the concern expressed by "War on Want", we must accept the fact that both Turkey and Iraq would resent representations by HMG to the Turkish Government on this question. Moreover, the Turks would also take exception to our raising the question of Kurdish refugees when, in their view, we have refused for five months to allow some 8,500 Turkish-Cypriot refugees who took shelter in the Western Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus to be moved to Turkey. We could answer this argument by pointing out that in our view these are not refugees but displaced persons, that we had allowed them to enter the base and that all we were asking was that the Turkish Government should allow Kurdish refugees to enter Turkey. But we see no prospect that representations by HMG would have the desired effect, and they would certainly complicate our already delicate relations with Turkey, at a time when we need their cooperation over Cyprus.
3. South-East European Department concur.


T J Clark  
Middle East Department

19 December 1974

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No.	<b>DRAFT</b> letter	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:- Mr T Dalyell MP House of Commons	FROM Minister of State Telephone No. Ext.  Department
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.		
PRIVACY MARKING		
..... In Confidence		
	<p>Thank you for your letter of 15 December enclosing a letter from Iain McDonald of "War on Want" about the situation in northern Iraq.</p> <p>It is always disturbing to hear of internal strife in any country and particularly so when innocent people and their families are left homeless and forced to become refugees. In the present case I understand that upwards of 120,000 Kurdish refugees have crossed the border into western Iran where, I am informed, they are being well cared for by the Iranian Government through the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society. The Iranian Government has said that it is well capable of caring for these refugees and I understand that several British and other international charities have contributed help to the Red Lion and Sun Society. Although I have heard rumours, I have received no confirmation that there is a refugee problem on the Turkey/Iraq border.</p> <p>In answer to Mr McDonald's specific inquiries I should point out that as this and previous Governments have explained on a number of occasions HMG have no formal standing to intercede on behalf of citizens of other countries. But when the strength of public feeling in the UK about the domestic</p> <p>/policies</p>	



policies of another country is such that there is a risk that damage might be done to our relations with the country concerned, we are sometimes prepared to draw this fact to the attention of the Government in question. We do of course only take this step when we believe that it would do some good; that it would not be rejected out of hand as an unwarranted interference in internal affairs; and it would not be counter-productive. You will understand if I say that it is for the Government to decide when these criteria have been fulfilled; and how they choose to act. We stand in different relations to different countries and the possibilities of exerting influence vary accordingly. These are facts which our policies necessarily have to reflect. But this does not imply that there is any difference of principle in our attitude to violations of human rights in different countries.

In the case of the Kurds and the Iraq Government not only do we have no formal standing to intercede but we also do not consider that an approach of the kind I have described above would be effective or helpful to those concerned.

I have considered most carefully the request that we should make representations to the Turkish Government over the closure of their border with Iraq to Kurdish refugees. I have concluded reluctantly that any such approach would be resented by both the Turkish and the Iraqi Governments and that there is therefore no prospect that it would lead to the border being reopened.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN




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(138)

FM TEHRAN 191000Z DEC 20 DEC 1974

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29/12

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 700 OF 19 DEC, <sup>1974</sup> AND TO BAGHDAD

121 (Part 8)  
YOUR TEL NO 491 : SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND AID TO THE KURDS.

1. MOYNIHAN WROTE TO ME ON 26 NOVEMBER SAYING THAT HE WOULD CALL ON ME BEFORE LEAVING TEHRAN FOR HIS FACT FINDING VISIT TO KURDESTAN. IN THE EVENT HE DID NOT CALL EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER HIS TRIP.

2. THE IRANIAN PRESS TODAY CARRIES REPORTS OF A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY MOYNIHAN IN LONDON IN WHICH HE SAID THAT A 4-MAN SCF MEDICAL TEAM WILL START WORK AT HAJI-CMRAN NEXT WEEK.

3. SINCE THEY SEEM TO BE AVOIDING US YOU MAY WISH TO SPEAK AGAIN TO THE SCF AND TO EMPHASISE THE LIMITS OF THE CONSULAR PROTECTION WHICH WE CAN OFFER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AN AGREED LINE FOR ANY QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE ABOUT THIS. WE CANNOT OBVIOUSLY SUPPORT OFFICIALLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF A RELIEF TEAM TO IRAQI TERRITORY WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND WE SHALL PRESUMABLY WANT TO AVOID PUBLICLY CRITICISING A MISSION SENT OUT FOR PURELY HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.

SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS (ARE THERE ANY PRECEDENTS FROM BIAFRA ?)

I PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE HERE THAT THE SCF IS A CHARITABLE ORGANISATION WHICH OPERATES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS ENTIRELY INDEPENDENTLY OF HMG AND THAT HMG ARE NOT INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN THE DESPATCH OF THE MEDICAL MISSION.

BUT WE MAY WELL BE PRESSED TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT HMG APPROVE OF ITS DESPATCH AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT LINE WE SHOULD THEN TAKE.

PARSONS

FILES

MED

MR WEIR

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


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CYPHER CAT 'A

FM BAGHDAD 191430Z DEC. 1974

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 493 OF 19 DECEMBER 1974, INFO  
PRIORITY TEHRAN AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 492 : IRAN/IRAQ - KURDISTAN.

1. I WAS CALLED TO SEE THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THIS AFTERNOON. THE MINISTER RAISED, NOT RAPIER BUT A REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED THAT A BRITISH MEDICAL MISSION WAS SETTING OUT FOR KURDISTAN. HE SAID THAT IN IRAQI EYES BRITAIN HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR A NUMBER OF UNFRIENDLY ACTS AGAINST THE ARABS IN GENERAL AND IRAQ IN PARTICULAR, FROM THE BALFOUR DECLARATION ON (HE INSTANCED "BAD HANDLING" OF IRAQI CITIZENS IN BRITAIN, PRESUMABLY THE PROSECUTIONS FOR SHOP-LIFTING, AND OUR ALLIANCE WITH IRAN). I INTERJECTED THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO TRADE PAST UNFRIENDLY ACTS I COULD SUPPLY A LIST OF MY OWN, BUT I WAS WORKING IN THE BASIS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, THAT WE HAD OPENED A NEW PAGE.

2. HAMMADI CONTINUED THAT IN THE LAST YEAR OR SO IRAQ HAD MADE A REAL EFFORT TO CREATE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES IN THE WEST, INCLUDING BRITAIN. HOWEVER FOR IRAQ KURDISTAN WAS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND THEY WOULD TOLERATE NO INTERFERENCE OR SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT A MEDICAL MISSION CONSTITUTED ONLY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, BUT FOR IRAQ IT WAS HELP FOR THE ENEMY. ACCORDINGLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WISHED GPPKDNER A VERY STRONG PROTEST AT THIS BRITISH ACT.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT, IF THIS REPORT WERE TRUE, IT COULD NOT RELATE TO ANY SORT OF OFFICIAL MISSION. THAT THERE MIGHT BE A PRIVATE MISSION WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE AND IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CHOSE TO REGARD THAT AS A MATTER OF PROTEST IT WAS THEIR RIGHT. BUT TO HOLD THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF THIS NATURE



WAS TO ASK US TO OVERTURN OUR WHOLE SYSTEM AND AMOUNTED IN TURN TO INTERFERENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, AND I PERSONALLY, WERE SINCERELY WORKING TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE PAST WAS THE PAST BUT AS I KNEW FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AT THE TIME OF THE BIAFRAN WAR, WE WERE POWERLESS TO CONTROL PRIVATE INITIATIVES OF THIS KIND.

4. HAMMADI REPEATED THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVERTHELESS HOLD HMG RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SUPPORT TO THE KURDS, "HOWEVER INDIRECT," AND THAT THEY WISHED TO PROTEST STRONGLY AT THIS REPORTED MISSION. I UNDERSTOOD TO REPORT AND TO CONVEY ANY COMMENTS.

5. THE MINISTER SPOKE THROUGHOUT IN VERY LOW KEY, AS IS HIS NATURE, BUT THE INTERVIEW WAS FAIRLY CHILLY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST HOW BADLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL IN FACT TAKE A MISSION OF THIS KIND. MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE IT AT A PROTEST WHILE MAKING THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR US E.G. ON THE VISA AND PERHAPS COMMERCIAL FRONTS.

6. SINCE DRAFTING THE ABOVE I HAVE SEEN TEHRAN TEL NO 700 (KNOT TO ALL) WHICH HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED. I MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN A STRONGER POSITION IN TALKING TO THE MINISTER HAD I RECEIVED THE REFERENCE. I TRUST THAT IF PRESSED (PARA 4 TEHRAN TEL UNDER REF) WE CAN CONFINE OURSELVES TO SAYING THAT IT IS NOT A MATTER FOR HMG TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE : THE ORGANISERS ARE FREE AGENTS.

7. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Can you help?  
IRD.



REGISTRY NO 35

31 DEC 1974

NBR 1/2

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

19 December 1974

1/2

G S Burton Esq  
Middle East Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
LONDON

Enter

in Williams

NB!  
for 1 week  
b/f

See folder.

I don't know how we  
can get these but I'd very  
be able to help 24/12

## KURDISTAN


1. The Defence Attaché was recently lent a booklet published by the Information Department of the Kurdistan Democratic Party entitled "On the Kurdish Question at the United Nations". Apparently this is No.2 in a series of booklets called "Know the Kurds". If you are able to obtain copies of the booklets we would be grateful to receive them.

Yours ever,  
K D Temple



CONFIDENTIAL

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 CYPHER/CAT A



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FM F C O 201700Z

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TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 354 OF 20 DECEMBER INFO  
 TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 493 AND TEHRAN TELNO 700: KURDISTAN

139 1. YOU SPOKE WELL.

138

2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AIR MARSHALL SIR JOHN LAPSLEY OF THE SAVE  
 THE CHILDREN FUND TELEPHONED THE DEPARTMENT EARLY THIS WEEK TO SAY  
 THAT THE FUND WAS SENDING A DOCTOR AND TWO ASSISTANTS TO IRAN  
 TO CONTINUE THE ROLE PLAYED, UNTIL THEIR FUNDS RUN OUT, BY TERRE  
 DES HOMMES ON THE IRAQ/IRAN BORDER. HE SAID THAT THEIR FUNCTION WOULD  
 BE TO CARE FOR KURDISH REFUGEES BETWEEN THE TIME THAT THEY CROSSED  
 THE BORDER INTO IRAN AND THE TIME WHEN THEY WERE TAKEN TO THE  
 IRANIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. THE WORK CONSISTED MAINLY OF INOCULATIONS  
 AND OTHER MINOR TREATMENT. LAPSLEY ADDED THAT THE FUND WOULD BE  
 GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE SHORTLY. WE REPEATED TO HIM WARNING ABOUT  
 CROSSING THE BORDER INTO IRAQ AND URGED HIM TO MAKE CLEAR AT  
 ALL TIMES THAT THE MISSION WAS IN NO WAY OFFICIALLY INSPIRED. WE  
 ALSO ASKED HIM TO ENSURE THAT THE IRANIAN EMBASSY WAS AWARE OF  
 THE FORTHCOMING PRESS CONFERENCE (THE EMBASSY HAD ALREADY BEEN  
 TOLD ABOUT THE PROPOSED MISSION).

3. WE AGREE ENTIRELY WITH THE LINE YOU TOOK AS REPORTED IN  
 PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND ALSO THAT IF  
 PRESSED YOU AND OTHER ADDRESSEES SHOULD CONFINE YOURSELVES TO  
 SAYING THAT THIS IS NOT A MATTER FOR H.M.G. TO APPROVE OR  
 DISAPPROVE. (LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF TEHRAN TELNO 700).

CALLAGHAN

FILES

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DEFENCE

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NEWS

PS/PUS

PS/MR ENNALS

MR CAMPBELL

MR NRIR


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Mr. Weir  
Mr. Coles



# KURDISH REFUGEES: MR DALYELL'S LETTER OF 15 DECEMBER

1. The "War on Want" letter enclosed with Mr Dalyell's raises two major points: of possible HMG intervention with the Iraq Government and of similar action with the Turkish Government either directly or through the EEC. I attach a draft reply which for the first point draws largely on Mr Ennals' letter of 20 September to Russell Johnston MP.

2. The Turkish Government's primary consideration in closing their border with Iran to Kurdish refugees was presumably their interest in improving relations with Iraq. Although we well appreciate the concern expressed by "War on Want", we must accept the fact that both Turkey and Iraq would resent representations by HMG to the Turkish Government on this question. Moreover, the Turks would also take exception to our raising the question of Kurdish refugees when, in their view, we have refused for five months to allow some 8,500 Turkish-Cypriot refugees who took shelter in the Western Sovereign Base Area in Cyprus to be moved to Turkey. We could answer this argument by pointing out that in our view these are not refugees but displaced persons, that we had allowed them to enter the base and that all we were asking was that the Turkish Government should allow Kurdish refugees to enter Turkey. But we see no prospect that representations by HMG would have the desired effect, and they would certainly complicate our already delicate relations with Turkey at a time when we need their cooperation over Cyprus.

3. South-East European Department concur.

T J Clark  
Middle East Department

19 December 1974

What with the shooting down of two Iraqi aircraft from Iran by British-made missiles, and the imminent despatch to the Iranian side of the border of a team by the British Save the Children Fund to succour Kurdish refugees, I fear that the Kurdish question is going to become an increasingly sore point

/in



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REGISTRY No 32  
2 JAN 1975

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in Anglo-Iraqi relations. Since we have no locus standi I am sure that we must resist these pressures to intervene, however much one may sympathise with the underlying humanitarian motives.

*M S Weir*

M S Weir  
20 December 1974

CONFIDENTIAL



FROM: TAM DALYELL M.P. NEWAS (Mr. Williams)



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Mr. Evans does not like the  
suggestion at X and would  
prefer to send a short reply himself.  
Folkestone - rapid draft.

15/12/74 A. J. Cohen 17/12.

1. Acknowledged ..... 17/12 .....

2. Minister of State has/has not seen

3. .... NEWAS ..... Department for  
advice and draft reply from..... Mr. Evans pl

De Dams,

X. Could I have  
a phone call  
from the Iraqi  
desk about 1 am  
I have Donald's letter,  
written to me in  
my capacity as  
Chairman of the PLB  
Foreign Affairs Group? Yours sincerely  
Tam Dalyell





Campaign against world poverty

467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE 01-609 0211 telex 24784

Mr. T. Dalyell, M.P.,  
House of Commons,  
London S.W.1.

13th December, 1974.

Dear Mr. Dalyell,

Further to your telephone conversation, I would summarise some of the factors which I believe might be of relevance to yourself and the Labour Party Foreign Affairs Committee, with respect to the situation pertaining in Kurdish Iraq.

As you will know, Iraq came into independent being following an agreement between the British and Turkish Governments (under League of Nations auspices). The British Government also signed a treaty of "Constitutional Force" with the Iraqi Government in 1931, whereby the Iraqi Government guaranteed the rights of the Kurdish peoples in Iraq. Later, the British Government, during discussion prior to the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations, undertook the "moral responsibility" for the treatment by the Iraqi Government of its minority peoples. Naturally, it would be unreasonable to expect the British Government now to fulfil that somewhat ambitious, but unspecific, commitment. Nevertheless, it is one of the factors that demand the continued moral involvement and interest by Britain in the internal affairs of Iraq. The other factors lie in the military involvement of Britain in the pacification of the Kurdish people in the early 1920's and their eventual incorporation into the state of Iraq.

The present situation raises further causes for concern which, I feel, demand Britain's renewed interest. In the first place, there are the now fairly well substantiated reports of the use of weapons that are banned by the Geneva Convention - there is a young 18 year old Kurd in the University College Hospital in London suffering from severe burns caused, it is believed, by a phosphorous bomb, and there have been persistent rumours of the use of these bombs and napalm against civilians for some time (see accompanying photographs). The policy being undertaken by the Iraq Government, of bombing civilian areas, has been confirmed by several independent witnesses, journalists and others, and is explicable when it is known that the Iraqi Air Force undertakes its bombing raids from a very great height, which precludes its use as a tactical, front-line, military weapon, and necessitates its use as an anti-civilian, morale-breaking, weapon. Possibly the most disturbing factor in the present situation is the closure of the Turkish-Iraqi border, which has prevented an unknown, but very considerable, number of civilian refugees, (estimated by the Kurdish authorities to be not less than 50,000 in number) to be trapped in the hills in the Badinan region of Iraq, with no food, shelter or any hope of escape, as their only escape route to Iran is under constant heavy shelling by the army. Virtually nothing is known about the condition of the few refugees who are known to have earlier crossed into Turkey. The one fact that is known is that, according to a recent statement by the Iraq Foreign Minister during a visit to Ankara, some of these have been returned, with the thanks of the Iraq Foreign Minister to the Government of Turkey, and it obviously raises questions about the willingness or otherwise of those who were returned.


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Various reports have been made about the state of the refugees who have crossed into Iran, and are being looked after in a very basic fashion by the Iran Red Cross. However, little is known about the numbers, although reports indicate the appalling situation of the refugees within Iraq who have had to flee the fighting.

With regard to the options open to the British Government and Parliament, it is, naturally, accepted that they are limited in extent. Nevertheless, as in previous situations, not too far distant, it is open to the House of Commons, and individual members of it, to raise questions about the actions of the Iraqi and Turkish Governments in the name of common humanity - without necessarily taking up the issues of the rights or wrongs of the present appalling war within Iraq. It is also open to the British Government, through diplomatic channels, to raise the same issue, on the same grounds, with the same two governments, with the suggestion that some external arbitrator could well assist in attempting to liaise between the two warring sides - at least to ensure that innocent civilians were not allowed to continue being used as pawns in a civil war. Furthermore, it is possible for the British Government to approach the EEC Commissioner to ask the Turkish Government, an associate member of the EEC, and a signatory of the European Charter on Human Rights, to allow civilian refugees from the fighting to cross the Iraq-Turkish border to temporary safety inside Turkey. Naturally, I make such suggestions with some timidity, and would welcome the opportunity of discussing the matter further with you. However, I expect to visit the Kurdish area of Iraq very shortly - leaving Britain on Thursday 19th December - and would be very happy to see you either before or after my visit.

Yours sincerely,



Iain O Macdonald  
International Director.



The Iraqi Army has introduced a new weapon to its already ~~diverse~~ <sup>wide</sup> array of Soviet supplied hardware in use - a phosphorous projectile which poisons human tissue.

Kurdish medical analysts have prepared a report in which they say the new weapon was used for the first time in early October on the Ruwandiz Front.

Phosphorous chemicals are deployed either by shells or bombs and in contact with human skin, will burn and poison tissues long after medical treatment has ceased, according to Idris Barzani, member of the Political Bureau of the KDP, in a briefing to foreign journalists in early November.

"They are definitely not incendiary devices. They are new. There is a chemical reaction and they poison the body," he said. "They are ordinarily prohibited weapons. This may be only a degree below the usage of poisonous gas."

(Two kinds of poison gas have been supplied to the Iraqi Army by Russia. They are stored at the headquarters of the Second Division in Kirkuk, and the Fourth Division in Mosul, as well as the Taji base camp near Baghdad).

Dr. Kamal Naji at the Kurdish Central Hospital in Galala area said, "Two Pesh Mergas were hit on October 23, at Garu Omar Agha, in the Rawandiz front: Mahmud Rashid and Zahir Said. They lit up the inside of the ambulance at night. Their faces and clothes were burnt, and their ears shrank to half their size." It is the first time it has been used in the area."

Napalm bombs are already a frequent weapon of war used by the Iraqis against the Kurds, but the Iraqi arsenal has much more sophisticated pieces at its disposal.

A new arrival on the battle front are the Iraqi ground to ground missiles operated from Army vehicles against Kurdish positions. Idris Barzani, one of the leading Kurdish military commanders, alleges that Iraqi bombers have been dropping special cluster time-face bombs which explode up to 72 hours after delivery making widespread regions inoperative.

The Iraqi Armed Forces also possess the advanced Swing-Wing MIG 23 Jet Fighter and the Medium-Range Supersonic Jet Bomber Tupolev 22 which has not as yet been delivered to the Soviet bloc countries.

The Russians have made Kurdistan a testing ground for the efficacy of their new weapons and equipment. In addition to their Swing-Wing bombers and the latest generation anti-personnel bombs, the phosphorous projectile is the latest of these lethal weapons, the use of which is a clear breach of the Geneva Conventions, to which Iraq and Russia are signatories.



international charities ignore the worsening plight of half a million refugees as winter sets in

## Rebel Kurds face famine and disease

From Edward Mortimer  
Derdend, Iraq, Nov 12

Iraq Kurdistan faces a human disaster this winter amidst the almost total indifference of international humanitarian organizations.

Kurdish doctors estimate that about half a million people have been displaced from their homes and made refugees by the fighting which started last March between Iraq Government forces and the Kurdish Pesh Merga and especially by the intensive government bombing. Of these only 135,000 have so far crossed the border into Iran where most of them are housed in some 12 camps provided by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society.

Most of the refugees have crowded into those areas still under the control of the Pesh Merga in spite of the large-scale Iraq offensive. All these areas are extremely mountainous and communications between them in wartime conditions are very difficult.

The worst affected area is Babinan, the north-western part of Kurdistan bordering on Turkey. Out of a total population of 250,000 in this region it is estimated that more than 100,000 are refugees from adjacent areas which are under Government control, such as Sinjar, Mousul and Zakho.

The border on the Turkish side has been tightly closed so that the only access from the outside world is over the Iranian border at Haj Omran, a few miles from Derdend and down the Chouman valley, which is the main administrative centre of the Kurdish revolution.

Already the town of Rawanduz at the bottom of the valley is in Government hands but

from Galala, about 25 miles higher up, the Kurds have built a dirt road leading westwards into Babinan. By this road, at least one stretch of which is exposed to Government shelling, it takes at present 16 hours to reach the town of Amabiyam and another day from there to the Zakho area.

Heavy rain and snow which are expected any day now will further slow down transport and may even stop it altogether for weeks at a time, the only alternative transport being mules which would take about seven days from Derdend to Amadiyah.

In all the "liberated" area, which is said to contain one and a half million people, there are 91 doctors, and the hospitals are scarcely recognizable as such. The central hospital near Derdend has 35 beds, the majority of which at present are in tents or huts open on one side, though buildings are now being constructed into which they can be moved for the winter. The laboratory is a tiny hut and equipment is virtually non-existent. Any cases requiring general anaesthetic have to be sent over the border into Iran.

Dr Khurshi Ibrahim Dizaye, a paediatrician who is in charge of the hospital, reeled off a list of prevalent diseases which had broken out in the refugee camps and had spread in the last few weeks to the general population—tuberculosis, urinary tract infection, infective hepatitis, protein and vitamin deficiencies.

Dr Adrian Hendrikx, a Dutch doctor sent out by Terre des Hommes, confirmed that a third of the children in the transit camp at Haj Omran were clear-cut cases of malnu-

trition and added that probably a large majority were suffering from it in some degree.

Almost all the refugees are women and children since the grown men usually enlist in the Pesh Merga. The plight of the refugees will worsen dramatically once the winter sets in.

The Kurdish military leaders are anxiously awaiting the rain and snow which are already overdue and which they believe will help them to repulse the Government offensive since the Pesh Merga are much better inured to such conditions than their opponents. But they admit that these conditions will be very hard for the refugees.

As Dr Mahmoud Othmann, one of the most influential members of the Kurdish political leadership, remarked to me with a grim smile: "So far it seems God prefers the refugees to the rest of us." Dr Kamal Naji, the under-secretary of the Kurdish health department, says there is an acute need for medicines, drugs, surgical equipment, and also basic provisions such as wheat, milk, blankets, tents, all types of clothing, rubber boots and tinned food. He also needs ambulance cars and a mobile surgical unit.

He and many other Kurds speak with some bitterness about the apparent indifference of the international community to their plight.

So far Terre des Hommes is the only foreign charity to send any concrete help. The International Committee of the Red Cross, to the Kurds' disgust, has refused to send anyone into Iraq without permission from the Iraq Government, even in response to the Kurds' invitation to come and inspect their prisoners of war.



# New arms supplies give Kurds hope of stopping advance by Iraq forces

From Edward Mortimer  
Derdend, Northern Iraq, Nov 13

New deliveries of ammunition in the last few weeks have greatly increased the confidence of the Kurdish autonomist leaders, who are holding out in this region against overwhelmingly superior Iraq Government forces. They now seem almost certain to prevent any further significant Government advances before the snow comes and are hopeful that the Government forces may even be obliged to retreat with heavy losses.

The Kurds are unwilling to identify the source of their new supplies, but they appear to be confident of supplies of artillery and ammunition. There is no sign of any armoured vehicles being deployed on the Kurdish side and still less of aircraft.

The main objective of the Iraq assault, which has been in progress since early August, is to break through into this valley on the Iran frontier to the basin of Rawandiz which is about 45 miles west of the frontier. Scattered up and down the valley around the small town of Couman are the main administrative and military centres of the Kurdish revolution, led by the septuagenarian General Mustafa Barzani.

The assault is now concentrated on two main fronts, one at Rawandiz at the western end of the valley and the other at Ranya, over the mountains to the south. According to Mr Idris Barzani, General Barzani's son and to all intents and purposes his Defence Minister, the Government has deployed three and a half to four infantry divisions and 12 artillery battalions on the Rawandiz front and three to three and a half divisions with eight artillery battalions on the Ranya front, plus a total of 550 tanks and the Air Force equipped with the latest and most modern Soviet aircraft.

On the same two fronts, according to Mr Idris Barzani, the Kurds have about 12,000 men armed with largely obsolete weapons but who have a remarkable determination and sincere belief in their cause.

His brother, Mr Mas Oud Barzani, who acts as chief of intelligence, puts Kurdish casualties for the whole war up to October 15 at 535 killed and 130 wounded, not including civilians of whom 493 were killed and 952 wounded. On the Government side, he claims 5,260 killed and 9,392 injured.

This morning I paid a visit with two British colleagues to the Kurdish commander on the Rawandiz front at his headquarters in a cave beside the Hamilton road, one of Kurdistan's very few metalled roads. Known to his forces as Kak Sami, he is a member of the Politburo of General Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Under his more official name of Muhammad Mahmud Abdulrahman, he was Minister of Northern Affairs in the Iraq Government until March this year.

In March the KDP left the Government after refusing the version of Kurdish autonomy decreed unilaterally by the Baathist Revolutionary Command Council.

As a minister, Mr Abdulrahman was responsible for the economic development of Kurdistan. "I am destroying now many things which I built", he told us ruefully today, "including a fine hotel on the highest hill in Rawandiz which took three years to build. Now it is a military camp and the target of my shells since yesterday."

He added that there were no families living in Rawandiz. The Kurdish population had fled when the Government troops occupied the town in August. The Government forces made some important gains in August when they occupied Rawandiz and also the town of Qala Diza, which is south-east of Ranya. Since then their progress has been very slow since all routes from these points to the Kurdish headquarters area are very mountainous and relatively easy for the Kurds to defend.

They have apparently given up trying to advance directly up the metalled road from Rawandiz towards Chouman and instead have been directing their main thrust northwards

towards a village called Beshe which is on the dirt road built by the Kurds to link their headquarters with the western part of Kurdistan, called Dadinan. Their main success in this direction so far has been the capture of a mountain called Zorzak where their biggest advance occurred as recently as the night of October 24.

It was that same night that Mr Abdulrahman, who had recently returned from a mission to seek support in Europe and the United States, took over command of the Rawandiz front. In his view, the little progress they made was due to the fact that the Kurds were out of ammunition.

"This is not a partisan war here, but a frontal war in which land is precious, you cannot fight such a war with nothing but rifles. Now, however, we are in a much better position." A big Government attack was expected by the Kurds on November 8 and they attribute its postponement to the effectiveness of their own shelling. As Mr Abdulrahman puts it: "They are in a situation of self-blockade." They have put their armies in a basin where they can be seen by our outposts and easily shelled. They have the choice, either to leave them at the mercy of our artillery or to withdraw.

"They have already withdrawn the 20th and 3rd brigades and one or two battalions which had lost. 25 division has been dismantled but the 20th brigade, which is their best, has now been reorganized and brought back."

The Kurds have also been stepping up their partisan operations behind the Government lines. Mr Idris Barzani claimed last night that in the previous 24 hours they had carried out very successful operations in the Kirkuk region, including the cutting of an oil pipeline and the destruction of a pumping station and a power station. They had also captured four policemen and killed some others in Sulaymaniyah and destroyed five vehicles with mines.



# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## Kurd refugee camps

*From Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Drummond*

Sir, I have recently returned from a visit to the Kurd refugee camps in the Razaiyeh area of North West Iran.

A total of more than 100,000 people crossed the border when life became difficult in Kurdistan and the provision of care and medical supplies for them has been undertaken by the Imperial Government of Iran through the Red Lion and Sun Society whose magnificent work has up till now received scant recognition in the outside world.

Each family, in the camps I visited, had been accommodated in two moderately large single fly tents but no effort or money is being spared in order to provide suitable brick buildings before the onset of winter.

The food supply is good in quality and quantity. Hot showers are available each day in two of the camps and in the third, where there is a water shortage, transport is arranged to take the people to baths in the nearest town. Medical care is under the control of the Kurds themselves and I considered that its organization could be considerably improved.

Many of the refugees, after privation and escape from bombing and missile attacks, arrived in Iran in a poor state of health or frankly ill, with their resistance to disease gravely lowered. Consequently, outbreaks of gastro-enteritis, typhoid and the enteric group of fevers and infective hepatitis have in the camps reached epidemic proportions.

The precarious treatment of malaria is a matter for grave concern because of the danger of producing resistant strains of the parasite.

Many of the children appeared anaemic and underweight despite the adequate rations and a number had enlarged cervical glands. Coughs, colds and sore throats were common. These children provide fertile ground for the spread of tuberculosis from open cases of this disease in the three camps.

Over one third of the women in the camps were pregnant and so five hundred of them expect to be delivered within the next two or three months. Care, both ante and post-natal, leaves much to be desired. The reported infant death rate is very high and not all of the deaths occurring in the lines have been notified.

In one camp employment has been well organized by running continuous classes in art, craft, weaving, dress making, woodwork and mechanical engineering. Every effort is being made to provide schooling for the children and they are being taught the Kurd language.

It is unfortunate that the young women have not been encouraged to take up para-medical work. The burden on the doctors could be greatly relieved if training were begun at once. They could act as clinical clerks, health visitors, laboratory technicians, to the great advantage of the patients and the Kurd medical service.

Those who have found shelter in Iran are very grateful to the Imperial Government and consider themselves very fortunate. At the same time many are in a state of acute anxiety because of the plight of their kith and kin in Iraq, especially in the northern areas such as Badinan where there is a large concentration of displaced people. Their channel of supply and escape is seriously threatened leaving them almost without food and adequate clothing.

Bombing continues and unless an escape route is opened up immediately, these people will waste away and die or be exterminated by the bombing.

Many in this country will recognize the ready help and friendship extended to our forces in two wars by the people of Kurdistan.

I trust that in their hour of need we will not desert them.

Yours sincerely,  
ALEXANDER DRUMMOND,  
Chase Lodge,  
27 North Side,  
Clapham Common, SW4.





Kurdish refugees from the conflict with the Iraqis head towards the Iranian frontier on board a lorry with their possessions.

## Minorities throw in their lot with Kurds under impact of Iraq bombing Tribal distinctions vanish as nation is born

By Edward Mortimer

Everyone in "liberated" Kurdistan talks about "the revolution". You may or may not be a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) but, if you are in the mountains and taking part in the war effort, you have "joined the revolution".

General Barzani himself says that he dislikes this terminology—the word "revolution" for him having unpleasant connotations. But he is powerless to prevent its use, any more than he can prevent the widespread use of his portrait, which he also dislikes.

No doubt the use of the term originated in the early 1960s, when the KDP was in close alliance with the Iraq Communist Party. Much has changed since then, and the communists, who in 1963-64 took refuge among the Kurds from Baathist persecution, are now the allies and supporters of the Baath Party in its attempt to suppress the "Imperialist agent Barzani" and his "treasonous clique".

The Kurdish revolution, in any case, is not primarily a social revolution (though it has some socialistic features) but a national revolution like the American one of 1776—one

that brings a new nation into being.

In 1961, when the war began, it was very largely an affair between different Kurdish tribes. The handful of urban intellectuals who formed the politburo of the KDP were at first clearly out of place in the mountains, and there was much tension between them and General Barzani. In the late 1960s, indeed, several of them broke openly with him and even fought against him on the government side. By contrast the atmosphere of national unity prevailing in Kurdistan today is something amazing. Tribal distinctions have virtually vanished, and even the Assyrian Christians, bitter enemies of the Muslim Kurds earlier in the century, have now more or less merged with them under the impact of government bombing and devastation. The same applies to the Yazidis, or "devil-worshippers", from the Syrian border, many of whom are now to be found in the refugee camps in Iran.

It is surely significant that of all the refugees in Iran 80 per cent are children, and 13 per cent women. The 5 per cent who are men comprise only the old and infirm and a few camp guards. In other words, virtually all the able-

bodied men have stayed behind to fight.

The main fighting strength of the Kurds is still provided by the Pesh Merga (those who "offer their souls" for the cause)—a volunteer force of hardy mountain men, many of whom have become to all intents and purposes career soldiers through the long years of fighting, punctuated by uneasy truce.

But, behind these and alongside them, one finds any number of civilians from the plains and towns—doctors, teachers, engineers, even diplomats—who have come to play their part in the war effort. These are the people who run the hospitals, staff the various administrative services, organize the refugee camps, and act as guides and interpreters for visiting journalists.

Many of them are without news of their families, who are still in Baghdad or in the Government-occupied towns. Others have their families on the Iranian side of the border, where they are able to visit them perhaps once every three or four weeks. Most of them are going through this experience for the first time, and still feel somewhat incongruous in their Pesh Merga suits (a khaki version of the traditional baggy-trousered cos-

tume and turban). An engineer told me it was the first time in his life that he had worn traditional Kurdish costume.


"We are all city boys", explained a young teacher from Kirkuk. "This will be our first winter in the mountains."

The winter in Kurdistan is notoriously bleak, and the Pesh Merga are counting on it to make life unpleasant for the Government troops. It will also be unpleasant for the Kurdish civilians, and not least for the intellectuals from the towns.

Most of them are well aware of this. Their decision to come was not taken light-heartedly. For many of them, it was dictated by fear of being made to choose between active cooperation with the Baathist regime and prison or even death.

Active cooperation was out of the question once the regime was using force against General Barzani and the KDP. For the past 13 years these people have come to identify as Kurds first, Iraqis second, and General Barzani and the KDP have made themselves the unchallengeable symbols of Kurdish nationalism. One doctor summed it all up for me very simply, to a murmur of approval from a dozen listeners: "It is the fight of our people."





Kurdish irregulars muster near the front line in north-east Iraq where they are challenging Government forces.

## Like picturesque heroes from boys' fiction, rebels defy a modern army

# Kurds take on regulars in set-piece battles

By Edward Mortimer

It is not surprising that British correspondents who visit Iraqi Kurdistan usually come back brimming with enthusiasm for the Kurdish cause.

In so many ways the Kurdish war is British schoolboy fiction come true. The scenery is just like those films about the North-West Frontier. The people really do wear turbans, baggy trousers and brightly coloured sashes round their waists.

Every man from the age of 15 upwards has a Kalashnikov rifle slung from his left shoulder, with a spare magazine and a pistol stuck in his belt. Some of them also wear traditional shepherd's waistcoats, with horns on the shoulders to frighten wolves.

It is not just physically picturesque. The military situation itself has an adventure-story quality. A small mountain people, organized as a voluntary defence force with neither tanks nor aircraft, is holding at bay the overwhelmingly superior forces of an oil-rich state, generously supported, advised and equipped by Moscow.

However, it would be too

romantic to suppose that they are doing this with Kalashnikovs alone. It is true that the possibilities of partisan warfare in such mountainous territory are almost endless, and this makes the Government's chances of effectively pacifying the country by military methods seem doubtful. The farther its forces advance into the mountains, the more their garrisons and communications will be exposed to ambush and night attack.

But what the Kurds are attempting to do—so far with considerable success—is much more ambitious than that. Faced with a two-pronged Government offensive aimed directly at their headquarters area in the Chouman valley, they are not melting away into the mountains to regroup elsewhere but fighting a regular defensive action in which scarcely an inch of territory is conceded without a pitched battle.

The key weapon in this defensive operation is artillery. Even here, there can be no doubt that the Kurds are heavily out-gunned. But their great advantage is that the Government troops are trying to advance uphill. At any given moment, therefore, the Government positions are more easily visible

from the Kurdish positions than vice versa.

What is surprising is that this advantage is apparently not cancelled out by the Government's monopoly of air cover. The Kurds claim that their opponents are benefiting from the advice and supervision of Soviet experts in the coordination of air and artillery action.

If this is true, it says little for Russian expertise. The battlefield is constantly overflown by MiGs, Sukhois, Hawker Hunters and Tupolevs. Yet both the bombs and rockets fired by these aircraft and the shells whose aim they presumably help to direct, seem to fall more or less at random.

From time to time a village is bombed, with some damage to property and loss of civilian life. Sometimes artillery fire is concentrated on an area known to contain a Kurdish HQ. But an HQ is a difficult target, being usually both well protected and easily moved. The strange thing is that the Government forces seem not to make any sustained attempt to hit Kurdish gun emplacements.

To some extent this is an achievement of the Kurds' anti-aircraft defences. They claim to

have shot down 40 aircraft since the fighting began in March. The bigger and more modern aircraft—the Tupolev 22, Sukhoi 20 and Mig 23—fly at altitudes well out of range (the largest Kurdish AA-guns are only 40mm), but the Kurds believe they do this for political reasons—the pilots being Russian whom it would be embarrassing to have shot down—and that this is at the expense of accuracy in bombing and observation.

A further limiting factor for the pilots may be fear of overshooting the Iranian frontier by mistake. So far there has been only one bombing raid on an Iranian village, and this was fairly clearly a deliberate gesture—either an attempt to provoke the Shah into an all-out war, or (more plausibly) a warning to him not to meddle in Iraq's internal affairs.

Either way it has not been followed up, and Iranian support for the Kurds has if anything increased. This is not officially admitted on either side, but the Kurds make no serious attempt to conceal the Iranian provenance of many of their guns and vehicles.

This is the first of three articles on the Kurdish rebellion.



THE TIMES SATURDAY NOVEMBER 16 1974

## Kurdish leader warns West on Moscow's Iraq plans

From Edward Mortimer  
Zayeh, Iran, Nov 15

The Kurdistan Democratic Party, hard pressed in a civil war against the Iraq Government, accused the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations agencies of "shunting their international humanitarian obligations".

It appealed to the world for "all kinds of dietary, medical and moral help and assistance to our people who are fighting for their fundamental legitimate rights".

The party's 71-year-old leader, General Mustafa Barzani, in an interview given jointly to *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph*, also appealed to Britain and other Western countries "to help us morally, politically, militarily and economically, and by any other means". He urged the West to act in its own interests as well as for humanitarian reasons, in order to counteract Soviet influence in Iraq.

General Barzani, who was a refugee in the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1958, was violently critical of present-day Russian policies in Iraq and the Middle East. He accused the Russians of "pursuing a selfish policy, regardless of cost and of the human misery which they are creating".

He cited their expansion in the Persian Gulf, the special facilities they have been granted in the new Iraq port of Um al-Qasr, and their in-

terest in Iraq's Rumeila oil fields as indications of their intention to dominate the area.

Speaking at one of his secret headquarters near Haj Omran, on the Iraq side of the Iraq-Iran border, General Barzani said the majority of the Arabs in Iraq, as well as the Kurds, were against the present Baathist rulers. "But what can the majority of the Arabs in Iraq do against this police state?" he asked.

"Here comes the point of your help, to check Russian influence in Iraq. This Government is a danger to many other countries. It is working to achieve violent change and complete disruption in the whole area."

"If you were to stand by us and by the people of Iraq, maybe a Government will come which will realize that it is not by force of arms that this problem can be solved."

Earlier Mr Masoud Barzani, the general's son, who acts as chief of intelligence, had given us details of Russian involvement in the war. Russian military aid to Iraq since 1972, he said, was many times the total aid given in the previous 13 years.

Iraq's strength had increased from one mechanized brigade to about seven, including Soviet BTR armoured troop carriers; from 250 tanks to 1,200; and from 144 military aircraft to about 300, including Tupolev 22s, Sukhoi 20 fighter-bombers and lately MiG 23s.

tomorrow, according to Beirut newspaper Al-Naba, which is usually well-informed on Shiite affairs.

The executions, if carried out, will be the first of the kind in living memory to demonstrate the lengths to which the ruling Ba'athists are ready to go to silence opposition to their war against the Kurds.

The five men were convicted of belonging to an illegal organisation, "the Islamic Mission." Some 30 others, both soldiers and clergy, have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from life to five years.

The orthodox Sunni Moslems have always dominated the political life of Iraq. The Shiites of the South, though numerous, have traditionally shown the passive, inward-looking character of a minority—underprivileged minority. It is clear, however, that, as a result of the Kurdish war, unrest is growing among them, and that it is a sense of sectarian resentment against the Baath Government.

The main reason is that Shiites are bearing the brunt of the war in the North. They probably furnish anything from 50 to 80 per cent of the soldiers in a Sunni-dominated army.

According to reports from Kurdistan, the Kurdish Peshmarga forces, equipped with more advanced weapons, continuing to inflict very heavy casualties on the Iraqis, not only on the main Rawanji front but on a new one at Dohuk, further to the West.

According to reports from the Iraqi side, the Shiite community is deeply shocked at the huge number of funerals taking place in recent months in the holy city of Najaf.

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 4 1974

## Red Cross gives medical aid to Kurdish fighters

From Our Correspondent  
Geneva, Dec 3

After Iraq's rejection of its offers of humanitarian aid, the International Committee of the Red Cross has taken upon itself the initiative of sending a first batch of medical supplies for Kurdish nationalists fighting inside Iraq.

The one-ton consignment has been delivered by the ICRC to Kurdish representatives in Iran, who accepted responsibility for onward transport and distribution across the frontier in Iraq territory under the control of the Kurdish guerrillas.

### Kurds in Iraq

From Mr Russell Johnson, Liberal MP for Inverness

Sir, May I, as Liberal Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, be permitted to comment on two articles in *The Times* of October 16 and November 13, describing the increasingly desperate situation of the Kurds in Iraq.

The Iraqi Government clearly regard the present war as the decisive encounter and are using every available means to crush the Kurds' resistance and force them to abandon their goal of an autonomous and democratic Kurdistan. So far even the repeated bombing of civilian targets and the use of a whole range of highly sophisticated Soviet military hardware, including Tupolev 22 bombers, have failed to achieve this end, but if the war is allowed to continue in its present intensity, many Kurds face a very grim winter indeed and possible starvation in the more remote regions of Kurdistan. There is a pitiful shortage of trained doctors and medical supplies to deal with the many casualties of the war, yet to date almost no aid has been forthcoming from international organizations, nor are the usual relief agencies operating in Kurdistan.

In the absence of an international response to the Kurds' situation it is, to say the least, surprising that the British Government do not feel obliged to intercede on the Kurds' behalf, particularly given Britain's historical responsibility under the League of Nations Mandate of 1925. The Foreign Secretary himself said in the debate on the Queen's Speech that we should not remain silent on issues of human rights and political freedoms and that the Government would speak and act whenever and wherever they felt it to be right.

I appreciate that it is ultimately for the Government to decide when and where such action will be taken. However, I would simply point out that the Kurds' case involves both human rights and political freedoms and that the Foreign Secretary should therefore act in accordance with the admirable principles he outlined to the House.

May I say that the question of a joint condemnation of the Iraqi Government by the Council of Ministers was raised at the last session of the European Parliament, a proposal to which I naturally gave my support. It is none the less a pity that the British Parliament has failed to live up to its



The refugee situation in Iraqi Kurdistan where the war has been waged on the Kurdish people and their homeland since the last outbreak of war in March 1974, has now reached a critical stage. Last month there were 400,000 people displaced and made refugees, this month the bombardment has made this rise to the figure approaching half a million. The war continues unabated with the use of the most sophisticated weapons against the Kurdish nation, and it is the women and children, as always in these situations, who have no choice but to submit to these unending atrocities, and severe winter conditions can only result in the death of many thousands which as a result of the war can only be genocide.

The most critical refugee situation, as regards the gravity of the consequences of no action being taken is in the Badinan region. This is the worst hit area as far as the conditions of the civilian population is concerned. Out of a total population of 250,000, more than 100,000 are refugees from other areas like Sinjar, Mosul, Zakho and other areas under government control in the North-West of Kurdistan. At least 50,000 are trapped in the Badinan area on the Turkish border. Supply routes with means of getting essentials to the people in that area have been bombed. The border is closed by Turkey so they have no exit. The terrain is too mountainous to move to any other exit without supplies, or routes. There are 135,000 refugees in camps in Iran who have crossed the border to escape bombardment, and many thousand more waiting to leave war torn areas to obtain relief.

With regard to the Badinan area, the easiest access will be through Turkey. However, this border has been so sealed that trucks make a long journey through liberated areas to reach this remote and devastated region. The impossible task is such that as an average of ten children die daily, there being no food, medicine, shelter or warm clothing, a truck takes about 16 hours to reach this area from the North and in addition another day to reach Zakho area also in desperate need. Heavy rain and snows slow down this method of transport. Mules take about 7 days to get to the nearest area of urgent need, Amadia.

In this situation of utmost gravity, everything depends on the Turkish authorities. Either food, clothing and medical supplies must be allowed through the border, accepting that at least 50,000 women and children ~~concentrated~~ must be cared for at least on a temporary basis, or an enclave must be created for them either on the Iraqi side of the border or on the Turkish side of the border, so that they may be cared for by the High Commissioner of Refugees, no doubt aided by other international humanitarian organisations so that the burden would not land on Turkey but the humanitarian need would be attended to and fully safeguarded. Or, they must be allowed to pass over the border to a place of safety where this dreadful situation can be ~~relieved~~ before daily death and hardship is genocide on a massive scale.

The humanitarian aspect of this war is now at a stage which must override any political qualification. After eight months exposure to modern warfare, napalm, economic blockades, widespread disruption and destruction of houses, roads, transport and means of ~~xxx~~ livelihood, the civilian population of Kurdistan is left with a crucial situation with local food supplies running out, roads blocked by snow and only mountains, without any shelter food or medicine, to resort to. As always in similar situations of man-made disasters, the most vulnerable groups are suffering most, the women and children.





## Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**London SW1A 2AH**

31 December 1974

From The Minister of State  
The Rt Hon David Ennals MP

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No 35  
- 2 JAN 1975  
NBR 1/2

Thank you for your letter of 15 December enclosing a letter from Iain McDonald of "War on Want" about the situation in northern Iraq.

Internal strife in any country is distressing, particularly so when innocent people and their families are left homeless and forced to become refugees. In the present case I understand that upwards of 120,000 Kurdish refugees have crossed the border into western Iran where, I am informed, they are being well cared for by the Iranian Government through the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society. The Iranian Government has said that it is well capable of caring for these refugees and I understand that several British and other international charities have contributed help to the Red Lion and Sun Society. Although I have heard rumours, I have not been able to establish hard facts as to whether a serious refugees problem exists on the Turkey/Iraq border.

In answer to Mr McDonald's specific inquiries I must make the point that HMG have no formal standing to intercede on behalf of citizens of other countries. But when the strength of public feeling in the UK about the domestic policies of another country is such that there is a risk that damage might be done to our relations with the country concerned, we are sometimes prepared to draw this fact to the attention of the Government in question. We do of course only take this step when we believe that it would do some good; that it would not be rejected out of hand as

**/an**

T Dalyell Esq MP  
House of Commons  
LONDON SW1A 0AA





an unwarranted interference in internal affairs; and it would not be counter-productive. You will understand if I say that it is for the Government to decide when these criteria have been fulfilled; and how they choose to act. We stand in different relations to different countries and the possibilities of exerting influence vary accordingly. These are facts which our policies necessarily have to reflect. But this does not imply that there is any difference of principle in our attitude to violations of human rights in different countries.

In the case of the Kurds and the Iraq Government not only do we have no formal standing to intercede but we also do not consider that an approach of the kind I have described above would be effective or helpful to those concerned.

I have considered most carefully the request that 8 we should make representations to the Turkish Government 8 over the closure of their border with Iraq to Kurdish 10 refugees. I have concluded reluctantly that any such approach 9 would be resented by both the Turkish and the Iraqi Governments 11 and that there is no prospect that it would lead to the border 13 being reopened. 2




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SECRET



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MED

*JHB*  
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*M. Williams*

*Some interesting comments  
on Iranian and Israeli involvement.  
Still no mention of Repier.*

*J31/12*  
*fe*

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TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 310815Z DEC INFO PRIORITY FCO AND  
JISHE SAVING KUWAIT BEIRUT DAMASCUS ANKARA AND TEHERAN.

DIG FOH

KURDISTAN

ONE. ALL ATTACHES WERE SUMMONED ON 30 DECEMBER FOR BRIEFING  
ON SITUATION IN NORTH BY DMI AT MOD. THIS IT IS HOPED WILL  
BECOME A REGULAR MONTHLY FEATURE AND IS INDICATIVE OF IRAQ'S  
AWARENESS OF NEED TO COUNTER IRANIAN AND KURDISH PROPAGANDA  
. REUTER CORRESPONDENT HUGO ANSON ALSO CALLED TO EMBASSY  
FOR BRIEFING AND WILL BE FIRST BRITISH REPORTER ALLOWED TO  
VISIT AREAS IN NORTH OTHER THAN THOSE ON SPONSORED VISIT TO  
ERBIL ON 5 OCT.

TWO. MOD BRIEFING WAS SURPRISINGLY FRANK AND DEVOID OF USUAL  
PROPAGANDA AND BAATH CLICHES.

THREE. PRESENT LINE HELD BY GOVT TROOPS SAME AS REPORTED IN  
MY FOH 262745Z NOV WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS AS FOLLOWS :

A. ZANTA PASS DUE NORTH OF AQRAH ON ROAD AQRAH TO BARZAN  
NOW CAPTURED BY GOVT TROOPS.

B. ZUZAK HEIGHTS NOW COMPLETELY IN HANDS OF GOVT AS WELL  
AS TATAH HEIGHTS IMMEDIATELY TO NORTH EAST OF ZUZAK THEREBY  
CUTTING KURDS SECONDARY LINE OF SUPPLY TO BALEK AND BEDIHAN  
AREAS (EQ BARZAN, AMADIYA AREAS).



C. ONLY NORTHERN SLOPES OF HANDRAN IN HANDS OF GOVT TPS.

FOUR. GOVT TROOPS ENGAGED IN MOPPING UP OPS (DEFINED AS CLEARING SMALL POCKETS OF PESH MERGA OFF HIGH GROUND) IN SULAIMANIYA QOISANJAO, DOKAN, RANIA, DOHUKZAKHO AND AGRAH AREAS.

FIVE. RECENT SURRENDERED KURDS SHOWED INDICATIONS OF POOR MORALE AND WEAKENING IN THEIR DESIRE TO FIGHT. IRAQ HAS RECENTLY CAPTURED SOME IRANIAN KURDS AND SOLDIERS DISGUISED AS PESH MERGA.

SIX. IRAQIS IMPRESSION IS THAT MOST KURDS WANT TO RETURN TO VILLAGES AND STOP FIGHTING BUT ARE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY

A. PRESENCE OF FAMILIES IN IRAN

B. PRESSURE FROM KURDISH LEADERS WHO SAY SURRENDER MEANS INSTANT EXECUTION BY IRAQIS.

C. CASES OF RUTHLESS ACTION BY KURDISH LEADERS INCLUDING EXECUTIONS TO STOP KURDS GOING OVER TO GOVT SIDE.

SEVEN. AS KURDISH SURRENDERS INCREASE (TOTAL FIGURES NOT GIVEN) AND WILLINGNESS TO FIGHT DECREASES SO IRANIAN ASSISTANCE TO KURDS INCREASES.

EIGHT. IRADWAN SUPPORT MAIN THOUGH NOT ONLY REASON FOR CONTINUED FIGHTING OF KURDS. SUPPORT IS BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT.

NINE. DIRECT SUPPORT. INCLUDES

A. IRANIAN ARMY UNITS IN IRAQ IN GALALA RANIA AND QALAT DIZAH AREAS SHELLING GOVT POSITIONS.

B. IRANIAN AA UNITS SUPPORTING IRANIAN MAIN GUN POSNS AND PESH MERGA HQS IN IRAQ.



C. REGULAR IRANIAN INFANTRY AND SPECIAL FORCES  
PROTECTING IRANIAN GUN POSNS AND OPERATING DISGUISED  
AS AND WITH PESH MERGA.

TEN. INDIRECT SUPPORT INCLUDES

A. FIRING APPROX 1000 HEAVY ARTY SHELLS INCLUDING  
GROUND TO GROUND MISSILES (DEFINED AS GRAD MULTI PARRELLED  
ROCKETS. DESPITE MANY QUESTIONS THESE WERE NOT IDENTIFIED  
OR CLARIFIED AS SPEAKER NOT FULLY BRIEFED ON THIS EOPT.  
EVERY TWO DAYS FROM IRAN INTO IRAQ MAINLY IN QALAT DIZAN AREA.

B. CONTINUED SUPPLY OF AMMO POL EOPT AND FOOD.

C. TRAINING EQUIPPING AND DESPATCHING GUERILLA GROUPS  
FROM IRAN.

D. CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON KURDS TO SEND FAMILIES INTO  
IRAN. EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT IN IRAN'S INTEREST IT WAS A  
MEANS OF PROLONGING CONFLICT AND RETAINING KURDS TO FIGHT.

E. ALLOWING JOURNALISTS TO PASS INTO IRAQI KURDISTAN.

F. SUPPORT THROUGH INFORMATION MEDIA WITH EXAGGERATED  
CLAIMS OF KURDISH ACTIVITY AND OTHER PROPAGANDA.

G. VIOLATIONS OF IRAQI AIR SPACE TO STRENGTHEN MORALE  
OF KURDS.

ELEVEN. SHOOTING DOWN OF BADGER A/C CLAIMED BY BOTH IRAN AND  
KURDS. HAWK MISSILES WERE POSITIONED JUST INSIDE IRAQI  
TERRITORY NEAR HAJI OMRAN AND BADGER CRASHED APPROX 10 KMS  
FROM FRONTIER IN IRAQ JUST TO EAST OF GALALA. OTHER A/C SHOT  
DOWN WAS SU7 DESPITE US DENIAL OF SUPPLY OF HAWK TO IRAN DMI  
PRODUCED TWO PHOTOS PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT AZERBIJAN  
DAY PARADE IN TEHERAN IN EARLY DEC SHOWING TOWED HAWK MISSILES  
IN PARADE.

Y-  
Published  
/ C. Kayser



TWELVE. WE WERE THEN SHOWN VARIOUS ITEMS OF CAPTURED IRANIAN EQPT AND FOLLOWING IDENTIFIABLE COMPLETE UNEXPLODED OR PART SHELLS 175 155 203 130 122 160.

FOLLOWING ARMS WERE SHOWN : 82 MM MOR 60 MM MOR SS10 AND 11 RPG 2 AND 7 BRNO LMG, CHINESE, RUSSIAN, AMERICAN AND BRITISH RIFLES CAPTURED FROM KURDS. SOME OF RUSSIAN EQPT THEY SAID WAS CAPTURED BY ISRAELIS IN SINAI AND PASSED TO KURDS.

THIRTEEN. IRANIAN MA ATTEMPTED TO DEFEND IRANIAN POSITION BUT WAS POLITELY TOLD IF HE WANTED TO CALL IRAQIS LIARS HE SHOULD DO SO UNDER HIS OWN ARRANGEMENTS. CHINESE MA ALSO TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO INFERENCE IN SHOWING CHINESE MADE WEAPONS.

FOURTEEN. HEAVY SNOW ON HIGH GROUND BUT ALL ROADS IN NORTH OPEN.

FIFTEEN. IRAQIS ADMITTED KURDS WERE CONTINUING GUERILLA ACTIVITIES BEHIND IRAQI POSITIONS AND ON L OF C.

SIXTEEN. PRESIDENT BAKR NOW APPEARING IN PUBLIC AGAIN.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.


GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

[Set to Dec]





BRITISH EMBASSY  
BEIRUT

1/8

5 December 1974

G B J Williams Esq  
NENAD

*different spelling 1/11*  
*Mr. Williams*  
*MEH*

*New Gordon,*

*enter MEH*

**LAST PAPER**

IRAQ: KURDISH REVOLT

Al Sayyad of 4 December has collected evidence which it considers shows that Mustafa Barzami is dead. In a dispatch from Baghdad the magazine described what it said were two cables interrupted by the Iraqi authorities from Barzani's "favourite son" Idriss and from a local rebel leader, Azad Sheikh Jalal. The first, addressed to all Kurdish military Commanders and intercepted on 20 November, said baldly that the "heroes of the north" should no longer think of Barzani as he was dead. The second, addressed to another rebel leader, Baba Taher Sheikh Jalal, intercepted on 23 November, stated that prayers "for the late Mustafa" would be held in Banguin.

2. The magazine noted that the Iranian government had denied the reports, but thought that the denial might be interpreted as rejecting reports that Barzani had died in Tehran, rather than denying that he had died at all. It also claimed that the voice of Kurdistan radio had stopped playing light music after 20 November. The Iraqi government, it said, had given no publicity to reports of Barzani's death for fear that they might be a hoax.

*Yours truly*

*Frank Gallagher*

F Gallagher

c.c. Baghdad  
Tehran



Situation Of Kurdish Refugees; Death Of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Kurds In Iraq. 27 Nov. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2309. Newspaper Cutting And Photographs. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107498697/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=f76af523&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107498697/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=f76af523&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.